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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Dupree Meadows (hereinafter Mr. Meadows and/or Appellant) appeals 
from convictions following a jury trial for the offenses of burglary, felony concealment 
of evidence, obstructing a police officer, and persistent violator. 
Mr. Meadows first assets that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress based on the police entering his residence and arresting him without a 
warrant. While he initially consented to the police being in his entryway, the police 
exceeded the scope of the consent when they entered further into his residence to 
arrest him. Thus, the warrantless arrest was illegal since the police did not have 
consent to be where the arrest took place, nor were there any exigent circumstances. 
In the alternative, the arrest in the apartment was illegal because Mr. Meadows had 
revoked his consent for the police to even be in the residence. 
Second, Mr. Meadows challenges his conviction for concealment of evidence. He 
asserts that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he had the requisite 
specific intent to prevent worthless items from being used as evidence when he 
allegedly threw them away, and instead, they were thrown away simply because they 
were worthless. Alternatively, while he was sentenced for felony concealment of 
evidence (actually he was illegally sentenced since the statutory maximum is 5 years in 
prison and he received 12 years), the facts which would enhance the misdemeanor 
crime to a felony were never charged nor was the jury instructed on them (and the jury 
was otherwise incorrectly instructed). Thus, in light of Apprendi, the felony 
enhancement cannot stand and the count must be reduced to a misdemeanor. 
1 
Third, Mr. Meadows asserts that he was wrongfully convicted of obstructing an 
officer. While he was actually charged with making a false report, there was no 
evidence of this, all the evidence was of him ostensibly obstructing or delaying arrest. 
Further, the jury was only instructed that he could commit the crime by resisting or 
obstructing or delaying arrest, and the instruction did not even address the making of 
a false report. Thus, the jury instructions consisted of a fatal variance/constructive 
amendment since they changed the charged crime into one that had been not charged. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While this matter was the subject of a jury trial, most of the relevant information is 
succinctly contained in the Defendant's Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. Since the primary issue on appeal concerns the motion to suppress, 
Appellant will utilize the facts contained in the briefing and supplement them as needed 
below for the other issues: 
The following facts are taken from the Incident Reports from the Coeur 
d'Alene Police Department and from testimony at the May 3, 2010 
suppression hearing. 
Coeur d'Alene Police Officer CV. Buhl responded to a call made by Dallas 
Fredrickson regarding items allegedly taken out of his truck during the 
early morning of November 17, 2009. According to written statements 
provided by Fredrickson and two other witnesses Chase Pappel and 
Josephine Ziady, the items were taken at approximately 1 :30 a.m. while 
Fredrickson was throwing a party at his house. Pappel and Ziady were on 
the front stoop smoking when they saw another person attending the 
party, an Africa-American man they identified as Dupree Meadows leave 
the house. Pappel and Ziady told Officer Buhl they went back into the 
house and came back outside five minutes later to allegedly see 
Meadows stand by Fredrickson's truck. They claim they saw Meadows 
then crouch down and sneak up to his car while allegedly picking up 
times along the way. They then state Meadows went back into 
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Fredrickson's house claiming he couldn't find his keys only to leave a 
short time later. 
After being informed of Meadows activities by Pappel and Ziady, 
Fredrickson checked his car and reported there [sic] where several items 
missing. Instead of contacting authorities, Fredrickson decided to find out 
where Meadows lived. The Coeur d'Alene Police Department was not 
contacted until over two hours later; only after the complaining witness 
had driven over to Meadows house to look for the vehicle, which they 
described as a grey Isuzu Trooper, he had allegedly driven earlier in the 
night. 
Once the complaining witnesses found the Isuzu Trooper located at 
Meadows apartment, they reported to Officer Buhl they could see items 
allegedly belonging to Fredrickson through the window of the vehicle. 
Fredrickson was advised by Officer Buhl to meet at Meadows residence. 
Once the police and witnesses met up, Fredrickson proceeded to lead 
Officer Buhl to the car he alleged Meadows had driven earlier in the 
evening, also noting the items he claimed to own. At the Defendant's 
Motion to suppress, Officer Buhl admitted he did not attempt to 
investigate the location of the alleged crime or examine Fredrickson's 
truck. Further, he was not aware of any other Coeur d'Alene police officer 
going to the scene of the alleged break in or who examined the vehicle 
owned by Fredrickson. 
After being given Meadows apartment number by Fredrickson, Officer 
Buhl and another officer knocked on the door of the apartment that had 
been identified by Fredrickson. To the best of his recollection, Officer Buhl 
stated it was around 4:00 a.m. The door was answered by Crystal Clark, 
who was eventually identified as Meadow's girlfriend. Meadows soon 
came down the stairs to the main entryway. As described by Officer Buhl 
in his report and in testimony, Meadows was not wearing anything but 
underwear at this time and throughout the duration of the interview. 
Officer Buhl proceeded to question Meadows and Clark about the events 
of the night and the allegedly stolen items. During his testimony at the 
Suppression Hearing, Officer Buhl admitted neither Meadows nor Clark 
made any admissions regarding the items in the Isuzu; further, the officers 
were instructed by Meadows on more than one occasions they were not 
to enter into the apartment past the entryway. After some questioning by 
Officer Buhl, Meadows told Clark not to answer any questions and 
requested the phone number for "internal affairs". After again requesting 
to enter further into the house, Officer Buhl testified Meadows stated the 
officers were not invited into the house. 
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Officer Buhl also testified he did see any contraband in the apartment 
during the interview, and was not concerned about Meadows being armed 
due to the nature of his dress. Finally, Officer Buhl testified he did not 
obtain any further corroborative information regarding the property 
during the questioning of Clark and Meadows. Officer Buhl testified 
Meadows was agitated soon after the questioning began, but at one point 
he believes Meadows advised Buhl to obtain a search warrant for the 
Isuzu. After approximately five-to-eight minutes of questioning without 
obtaining any new information regarding the alleged theft, Officer Buhl 
made the decision on the sole basis of the statements made by 
Fredrickson, Pappel, and Ziady to arrest Meadows in the living room of 
the apartment. 
After Meadows arrest, officers found items alleged to have been owned by 
Fredrickson in a community dumpster for the apartments and on the 
back porch of the Meadows/Clark apartment. Three (3) days after the 
arrest of Meadows, the Coeur d'Alene Police Department used the arrest 
as a probable cause basis to obtain a search warrant to search the Isuzu 
Trooper for the items allegedly owned by Fredrickson. 
Defendant's Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress at p. 2-5. (R. p. 178-181.) 
Mr. Meadows was charged by criminal complaint with felony burglary and 
concealment of evidence, as well as being cited for obstructing an officer. (R. p. 54-55, 
56.) He waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to district court, where an 
Information charged him will all three of the above crimes. (R. p. 96.) 
The body of the information provided as follows in full: 
BARRY MCHUGH, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of 
Kootenai, Sate of Idaho, who prosecutes in its behalf, comes now into 
Court, and does accuse DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS with committing 
the crimes of COUNT I, BURGLARY, Idaho Code section 18-1401, and 
COUNT II, CONCEALMENT OF EVIDENCE, Idaho Code section 18-
2603, COUNT Ill, RESISTING OR OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER(S), 
Idaho Code section 18-1705, committed as follows: 
COUNT! 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1 ih 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
enter into a certain vehicle, the property of Dallas Fredrickson, located at 
845 N. 6th Street, Coeur d'Alene, with the intent to commit the crime of 
theft; 
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COUNT II 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1 yth 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
willfully conceal papers and/or a photo and/or other items knowing that 
they were about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence in an 
investigation authorized by law and with the intent to prevent it from being 
so produced, used or discovered. 
COUNT Ill 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1 yth 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
willfully resist and/or obstruct a public officer(s) to-wit: Officers C. Buhl and 
B. McCormick, Coeur d' Alene Police Department, in the discharge of a 
duty of their office by knowingly (sic] make a false report the officers, all 
of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case 
made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the 
State of Idaho. 
Information, p. 1-2. (R. p. 101-102.) 
Mr. Meadows brought a motion to suppress any and all statements, 
observations, evidence, information or any other evidentiary fruits obtained as a result 
of the detention, arrest, search, seizure and questioning of the defendant. (R. p. 105.) 
A hearing was held on the motion, which the court denied in a written order. (R. p. 188.) 
Later, the state amended the information to charge persistent violator. That is not 
at issue here, and the body of the information regarding the three crimes remained the 
same: 
COMES NOW TERRI LARID and does hereby amend the Information as 
follows: does accuse DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS with committing the 
crimes of COUNT I, BURGLARY, I.C. section 18-1401, 19-2514, 
COUNT II, CONCEALMENT OF EVIDENCE, I.C. section 18-2603, and 
COUNT Ill, RESISTING OR OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER(S), 1.C. 
section 18-1705, committed as follows: 
COUNTI 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1yth 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
enter into a certain vehicle, the property of Dallas Fredrickson, located at 
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845 N. 6th Street, Coeur d'Alene, with the intent to commit the crime of 
theft, and 
COUNT II 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1th 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
willfully conceal papers and/or a photo and/or other items knowing that 
they were about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence in an 
investigation authorized by law and with the intent to prevent it from being 
so produced, used or discovered, and 
COUNT Ill 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1th 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
willfully resist and/or obstruct a public officer(s) to-wit: Officers C. Buhl 
and/or B. McCormick, Coeur d' Alene Police Department, in the discharge 
of a duty of their office by knowingly [sic] make a false report the officers, 
all of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such 
case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People 
of the State of Idaho. 
Amended Information, p. 1-2. (R. p. 235-236.) 
Mr. Meadows proceeded to jury trial and the jury found him guilty of counts 1-3. 
(R. p. 319-320.) Mr. Meadows waived his right to a jury trial for the Part II, and the court 
found him guilty of being a persistent violator. (R. p. 284-285.) At the end of the state's 
case, Mr. Meadows brought an oral I.C.R. 29 motion, which the court denied. (Tr. 
7/28/2011, p. 241-243.) 
After the trial, Mr. Meadows filed a written motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 
34 on the grounds of interest of justice and insufficient evidence. (R. p. 323.) He also 
filed a written Rule 29 motion asserting that the evidence presented was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction. (R. p. 325.) The court denied the motions at the sentencing 
hearing. (R. p. 328.) 
The court sentenced Mr. Meadows to 12 years with the first 2 years fixed on both 
the burglary count with persistent violator and the concealment of evidence count, and 
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180 days in jail on obstructing, all to run concurrent to each other and to an Ada County 
case. (R. p. 334.) 
Mr. Meadows timely appeals. (R. p. 338-340.) 
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ISSUES 
I. 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
BECAUSE THE POLICE EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT WHEN THEY 
ENTERED FURTHER INTO THE APARTMENT TO ARREST APPELLANT AND/OR 
THE CONSENT TO POLICE ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE HAD BEEN REVOKED 
II. 
WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MR. MEADOWS HAD 
THE REQUISITE SPECIFIC INTENT FOR THE CONCEALING EVIDENCE CHARGE, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE FACTS WHICH ENHANCED THE MISDEMEANOR 
OFFENSE TO A FELONY WERE NEVER CHARGED AND WERE NOT FOUND BY 
THE JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT IN VIOLATION OF APPRENDI 
111. 
WHETHER THE OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER JURY INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED 
A FATAL VARIANCE SINCE IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A DIFFERENT 
METHOD OF COMMITTING THE OFFENSE THAN HAD BEEN CHARGED 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE 
POLICE EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT WHEN THEY ENTERED 
FURTHER INTO THE APARTMENT TO ARREST APPELLANT AND/OR THE 
CONSENT TO POLICE ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE HAD BEEN REVOKED 
A. Standard of Review 
The standard of review for this issue was explained by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560,112 P.3d 848 (Ct.App. 2005): 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
Id. at 562 (internal citations omitted). 
B. The motion to suppress and the court's rulings 
As mentioned above, the defense brought a motion to suppress and there was a 
hearing on it. The facts were as described in Defendant's brief in support of motion to 
suppress (hereinafter brief), already provided. In short, Defendant argued that the basic 
law is clear, to wit, the police cannot not enter a person's home to arrest him without a 
warrant. Without a warrant, police must have probable cause and the existence of exigent 
circumstances to lawfully enter a residence to arrest a suspect. Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980); State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 430 (2004). 
(R. p. 181 .) Defendant argued that neither one was present here, while the police may 
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have had reasonable suspicion, due to their insufficient investigation, they did not have 
probable cause. (R. p. 184, 192.) Further, the brief explained: 
According to Officer Buhl, Meadows allowed the officers to enter the 
residence, with specific instructions not to proceed past the entryway. In 
his reports and during his testimony at the Motion to Suppress, Officer 
Buhl stated Meadows became agitated to the point of requesting 
information for "internal affairs" and stating the officers "were not invited 
inside the house". Additionally, Officer Buhl stated Meadows never gave 
consent for the officers to search the house or vehicle and requested the 
officers to get a search warrant if they wanted to conduct a search of the 
vehicle. 
Brief, p. 7-8. (R. p. 183-184.) 
The brief then explained that even if a suspect gives consent to officers to enter a 
home to investigate, an individual may revoke consent and terminate an encounter. State 
v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 978 P.2d 881 (Ct.App.1999). The Defendant argued that even 
with his initial consent to enter the entryway of the home, Mr. Meadows' actions indicated 
to the officers that he was revoking his consent and attempting to disengage from further 
warrantless actions by the police. (R. p. 184.) 
The brief continued by explaining that generally speaking, exigent circumstance 
involve the imminent risk of loss of evidence, escape of a suspect or injury to others. 
State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 768 P.2d 131 (Ct.App. 1989). Further, police officers 
cannot create their own exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into a 
residence. State v. Kelly, 131 Idaho 774, 963 P.2d 1211 (Ct.App. 1998). Here, according 
to the brief, as a result of the questioning of Mr. Meadows, the police did not obtain any 
further information regarding the items alleged to have been stolen, nor did the police see 
any contraband while inside the house. All other evidence was obtained after the 
warrantless arrest, to wit, the items found on the back porch and the dumpster. The 
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search warrant for the Isuzu Trooper was granted three days later. The brief concluded 
that here, the police officers' attempt to create exigent circumstances should not be 
allowed to justify their warrantless arrest of Mr. Meadows. (R. p. 185.) 
The court denied the motion in a written memorandum opinion. After describing Mr. 
Meadows' argument as that he subsequently revoked his initial consent (to the police 
presence in his entryway), the court ruled: 
Defendant argued that he revoked his consent when he allegedly 
"attempted to disengage from further warrantless actions by police officers 
from the same agency." Defendant's Brief, at 8. Defendant does not 
explain the factual basis for this allegation. Perhaps defendant has in mind 
his characterization of Officer Buhl's testimony, where defendant states: 
"Officer Buhl stated Meadows became agitated to the point of requesting 
information for 'internal affairs' and stating the officers 'were not invited 
inside the house."' Defendant's brief, at 7. Since defendant admits, and 
the evidence is uncontradicted, that he initially consented to the police 
presence in the entryway, defendant's subsequent statement that officers 
'were not invited inside the house' apparently meant that the officers were 
not invited to enter further inside the house past the entryway. A typical 
reasonable person would not have understood these statements to be a 
revocation of consent. 
EXIGENCY 
Defendant argues that here was no exigency for the police entry. "The 
Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless, non-
consensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine, non-
exigent arrest." State v. Jenkins, 155 P.3d 1157, 1159 (Idaho 2007) citing 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980). Since the 
entry into defendant's home was not "nonconsensual," no exigency was 
required. 
Opinion and Order Re: Motion to Suppress at p. 3-4. (R. p. 190-191.) 
Finally, the court ruled that there was sufficient probable cause for defendant's 
arrest for the felony of burglary and that the police had no duty to investigate the matter 
any further. (R. p. 191.) 
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C. The district court erred in finding that Mr. Meadows' arrest was not illegal since 
the officer's entry into the residence to effect the arrest exceeded the scope of 
the consent or in the alternative, the court erred in finding that Mr. Meadows did 
not revoke his consent. 
The issue here is very simple. Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Meadows did 
not revoke his consent for the officers to be in the entryway, they did not arrest him in 
the entryway, but entered further into the residence which was clearly beyond the scope 
of any consent. 
To explain further, it is absolutely clear that the initial consent limited the police 
officers to the entryway of the house. The police officer testified that neither Mr. 
Meadows nor Ms. Clark gave the police consent to go further into the residence and 
that the furthest they wanted the police to proceed into the residence was just into the 
immediate entryway. (Tr. Motion to Suppress hearing, 5/3/2010, p. 28.) 
The district court found that Mr. Meadows' comment that the police officers were 
not invited into the house meant that they were not invited further into the house (more 
on this below). Again, assuming arguendo this is a correct interpretation of that 
comment, the police officers did not arrest Mr. Meadows in the entryway; instead, they 
entered further into the house into the living room to arrest him. Thus, the police 
exceeded the scope of Mr. Meadows' consent, and so the district court erred in relying 
on consent as the basis on which the police could arrest Mr. Meadows in his residence. 
Since the arrest was warrantless and the police did not have consent to go 
further into the residence where the arrest was made, the arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution since no exigency was present which 
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would allow the non-consensual further entry into the residence to effect the warrantless 
arrest. The police did not claim there was an exigency, nor did the prosecutor, and the 
district court did not find any exigency existed. Nor could it be found, as made clear in 
State v. Kelly, 131 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 1998): 
As the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in Curl, supra, "this presumption 
[that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable] is a strong one," and the government bears 
a "heavy burden" to show an exigent circumstance that necessitated 
immediate police action. Id. at 225, 869 P.2d at 225. The determinative 
inquiry is "whether the facts reveal 'a compelling need for official action 
and no time to secure a warrant."' [internal citations omitted] 
Circumstances that have been held to constitute an exigency include 
imminent risk of injury to persons or property, destruction of evidence or 
escape of a suspect. [internal citations omitted] 
The State urges that Officer Bitton's warrantless entry into Kelly's 
residence was necessary both to prevent Kelly's escape and to avoid the 
destruction or loss of physical evidence linking Kelly to the arson. We find 
the State's argument untenable, however, because any exigency that 
arose here was of Officer Bitton's own making. There was no threat of 
immediate destruction of evidence or flight by a suspect until Officer Bitton 
knocked on the front door of the residence, thereby alerting Kelly to the 
officer's presence. Until then, Officer Bitton could have retreated 
undetected and could have obtained a search warrant without fear that 
the suspect would be prompted to flee or to destroy valuable evidence. 
Id., at p. 776 (internal citations omitted). 
The same is true in our case. If the police believed they had probable cause for 
a warrant, they could have obtained one before knocking on Mr. Meadows' door. 1 
What's more, even if they had first spoken with Mr. Meadows, they still could have 
retreated and obtained a warrant. Given that it was 4:00 A.M., Mr. Meadows was at 
his home in his underwear, no contraband was seen in the apartment, the police were 
between him and his car, and the alleged offense was non-violent, there was absolutely 
1 As mentioned above, the police entry into Mr. Meadows' residence provided no 
evidence corroborating the alleged crime. 
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no reason that the police could not have taken the time to obtain a warrant after 
contacting him. And even if there was an exigency, it was police created. 
Accordingly, since the police entry was ultimately non-consensual and there was 
no exigency, the arrest was illegal and the district court erred in not suppressing all of 
the evidence obtained during and following the illegal arrest. 
In the alternative, Appellant asserts that the district court erred when it found that 
Mr. Meadows did not revoke his initial consent for the officers to be in the entryway.2 
The court found that a "typical reasonable person" would find that Mr. Meadows' 
statements that the officers were not invited into the house to mean they were not 
invited to enter further inside past the entryway. Appellant asserts that said 
interpretation is simply wrong. The "typical reasonable person" would understand that 
Mr. Meadows agitation and desire to call internal affairs on the police officers shows that 
his comment about them not being invited was his (ignored) attempt to kick them out. 
Therefore, since Mr. Meadows had revoked consent, his arrest was illegal regardless of 
where it occurred in his residence (and there was no exigency, as explained above). 
2 Actually, that consent was not even valid since it was not freely given. A police officer 
testified at trial that he threatened to kick the door down. He further testified that he did 
so even though he did not think the situation warranted it but just said so in the hopes 
that someone would open the door (which happened). (Tr. 7/27/2010, p. 250-251.) 
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11. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MR. MEADOWS HAD THE 
REQUISITE SPECIFIC INTENT FOR THE CONCEALING EVIDENCE CHARGE, OR 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE FACTS WHICH ENHANCED THE MISDEMEANOR 
OFFENSE TO A FELONY WERE NEVER CHARGED AND WERE NOT FOUND BY 
THE JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT IN VIOLATION OF APPRENDI 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Meadows first asserts that there was insufficient evidence showing that when 
he allegedly threw out various worthless items he allegedly took from the victim's truck, 
that he had the specific intent to prevent them from being used as evidence. In the 
alternative, in order to be enhanced to a felony offense, the concealing of evidence 
must be in a criminal investigation involving a felony offense. The facts which would 
enhance this offense not charged in the information. Nor were they found by the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury instruction erroneously omitted that 
element. Thus, under Apprendi, Appellant could only be convicted of misdemeanor 
concealing evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
As to the standard of review for this issue, State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 (Ct. 
App. 2007), explained as follows: 
Appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
limited. A jury verdict will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial 
and competent evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find all 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not substitute 
our opinion for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses or the 
weight to be given to their testimony. The facts, and inferences to be 
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drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's 
verdict. 
Id. at 572. 
Mr. Meadows did bring an I.C.R. 29 motion challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence below (as well as a written motion). (Tr. 7/20/2010, p. 242-243.) Even if he 
had not, Idaho law is clear that the sufficiency of the evidence need not be challenged 
below in order to raise the issue on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873 (1995); 
State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694 (Ct. App. 1995). 
C. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Establish the Requisite Specific Intent 
The statute under which Mr. Meadows was charged and convicted provides as 
follows: 
§ 18-2603. Destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence 
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in 
writing, or other object, matter or thing, is about to be produced, used or 
discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or 
investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully destroys, alters or 
conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, 
used or discovered, is guilty of a misdemeanor, unless the trial, 
proceeding, inquiry or investigation is criminal in nature and involves a 
felony offense, in which case said person is guilty of a felony and subject 
to a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000) and a maximum 
sentence of five (5) years in prison. 
1.C. § 18-2603. 
As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607 
(Ct.App. 2003): 
... section 18-2603 establishes the destruction, concealment, or alteration 
of evidence as a misdemeanor offense, unless "the trial, proceeding, 
inquiry or investigation is criminal and involves a felony offense," in which 
case the crime is a felony offense. 
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Id., n. 1. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals continued: 
Section 18-2603 establishes two classifications for the crime of the 
destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. First, the statute 
classifies the crime as a misdemeanor offense. Parsing out the statute's 
text and linguistic meaning, the elements of this misdemeanor offense are 
as follows: 
1. The defendant knew that an object was about to be produced, used, 
or discovered as evidence in any legally authorized trial, proceeding, 
inquiry, or investigation; 
2. The defendant willfully destroyed, altered, or concealed that object; 
and 
3. The defendant in acting to destroy, alter, or conceal that object 
intended to prevent the object's production, use, or discovery. 
Second, section 18-2603 elevates the misdemeanor to a felony offense 
where "the trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation is criminal in nature 
and involves a felony offense." This language modifies only the first 
above-stated statutory element, which may be restated for a felony 
destruction of evidence offense as follows: 
1. The defendant knew that an object was about to be produced, 
used, or discovered as evidence in any legally authorized trial, 
proceeding, inquiry, or investigation involving a felony offense. 
In Element 5 of its Instruction 10, the district court required the state to 
prove that Peteja knew that the evidence was about to be produced in a 
legally authorized investigation. We conclude that the instruction 
incorrectly articulated the law applicable to the felony destruction of 
evidence because it failed to require the jury to find that the investigation 
was "criminal in nature" and "involved a felony offense." 
Id., p. 610. 
In our case, the errors regarding this count are myriad. If nothing else, Appellant 
points out that his sentence of 12 years was illegal since the statutory maximum 
sentence is 5 years. Further, the facts which allow the misdemeanor to be enhanced 
to a felony, to wit, that the investigation was criminal in nature and involved a felony, 
were not charged in the information, nor was the jury instructed that they have to find 
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those facts. Therefore, at most, Mr. Meadows was actually only convicted of 
misdemeanor concealing evidence. While this will be alternatively argued below, first, 
Appellant asserts that the dispositive issue is that the evidence was insufficient to show 
that he had the requisite specific intent. 
As explained above, concealment of evidence is a specific intent crime and so 
the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Meadows concealed 
evidence for the specific purpose to prevent the object's production, use or discovery as 
evidence. While there is evidence that Mr. Meadows allegedly threw away some 
worthless items supposedly taken from the victim's truck, there is a complete and utter 
lack of evidence to support the jury's finding that it was for the specific intent to prevent 
it from being used as evidence. Appellant asserts that the only reasonable inference 
from the facts, described below, is that the worthless items were thrown away because 
they were worthless, and that it is merely unsupported speculation that they were 
being concealed to prevent their use as evidence. 
Briefly, the items allegedly taken from the victim's (Dallas Fredrickson) truck were 
found in three different places. First, various items such as a jack and toolbox were 
found in the Isuzu Trooper and could be seen from outside the vehicle. Second, several 
items were found on the back patio of Mr. Meadows' apartment (which is open to the 
public) right next to his sliding glass door. The officer who found them said that there 
was a CD case on top of a American Moving Company sweatshirt (were the victim 
worked), and under it, but still visible, was a CD player and a tie down strap. (Tr. 
7/28/2010, p. 224, 227.) The CD player was missing its removable faceplate, but was 
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matched up to the faceplate that Dallas had, both physically and by serial number. (Tr. 
7/28/2010, p. 201, 215-216.) 
Third, and the subject of the concealing evidence charge, several items were 
found in a communal dumpster at the apartment complex where Mr. Meadows lived. 
Josephine Ziady (victim's girlfriend) testified that they were laying right on top, in plain 
sight. (Tr. 7/27/2010, p. 65.) Likewise, Dallas testified that he told the police that 
everything was not there (in the Trooper) and so he said maybe he threw some of it 
away and he and the officer walked over to the dumpster and he saw all of his 
paperwork inside. (Tr. 7/27/2010, p. 102.) Likewise, the police officer who found the 
times testified he looked in dumpster and saw papers scattered on the bottom that 
Dallas recognized as his. (Tr. 7/27/2101, p. 174-175.) 
Dallas identified the items as his Academy school record, the temporary 
registration from when he bought the truck, mirror mounts, a photo of his dog, shooting 
earmuffs, a black and blue tie strap, an unpaid bill, a manila envelope with his name on 
it, and his electric bill. (Tr. 7/27/2010, p. 106-109.) Again, these are the items which 
are the subject of the concealment of evidence charge, which is clear from both the 
charging language ("did conceal papers and/or a photo") as well as the prosecutor's 
closing argument about the concealing evidence charge which he explained is "the 
documents that are in the dumpster." (Supp. Tr. of Closing Arguments, p. 89, In. 18; p. 
93, Ins. 12-13.) 
This is a case where the obvious answer is obviously the correct answer, which 
is that the worthless items (to the thief) were being thrown out, not hidden. In his 
closing the prosecutor admitted this, "these are documents [the ones found in the 
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dumpster] that don't have any value and that one would typically not really want to 
keep." (Supp. Tr. of Closing Arguments, p. 89, In. 18-20.) But the prosecutor went on 
to argue that there was another reason that one would want to get rid of these items, 
which was because it was the property that had Dallas' name on it and so tied Mr. 
Meadows to the crime. (Id., p. 89-90.) 
This is not correct, however, for items that had nothing to do with Dallas were 
thrown away as well (the shooting earmuffs, mirror mounts and a tie strap), while items 
that were linked to him, such as a sweatshirt from his place of employment and the 
stereo for which he had the faceplate, were not. More importantly, there was not even 
an attempt to hide the discarded items, they were in a dumpster on top in plain sight 
and were seen by the victim and police as soon as they looked in the obvious place. 
In short, the theory that the worthless items were being hidden with the specific 
intent to prevent them from being used as evidence in an investigation is just that, a 
theory, and is based only on speculation. There are no facts which support it, and 
since there are no facts, there are no reasonable inferences which can be made based 
on facts. Appellant is not asking this Court to weigh credibility of the witnesses or view 
the evidence other than in the prosecution's favor, but to simply acknowledge that there 
was no actual evidence which proves this element beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
instead, it is just a guess. 
In short, without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element, Mr. 
Meadows' due process rights under the 51\ 6th and 14th amendments have been 
violated. See, In Re: Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Accordingly, Appellant requests 
this Court vacate this conviction. 
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D. Enhancing the Offense To a Felony Violates Apprendi 
Alternatively, in the event that this Court determines there is sufficient evidence, 
Appellant asserts that Mr. Meadows was really only convicted of the misdemeanor 
offense of concealing evidence. Again, the Information and amended Information 
charged as follows: 
COUNT II 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1 yth 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
willfully conceal papers and/or a photo and/or other items knowing that 
they were about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence in an 
investigation authorized by law and with the intent to prevent it from being 
so produced, used or discovered. 
Information, p. 2. (R. p. 102.) 
So to begin with, the charging document never alleged the facts necessary to 
enhance the misdemeanor crime of concealment of evidence to the felony crime, to wit, 
that the investigation was criminal in nature and involved a felony offense.3 
The jury instruction the court gave on this offense was as follows: 
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of Concealment of Evidence, as 
charged in Count II, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1 yth day of November, 2009; 
2. In the state of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, Dupree Lamar Meadows, knowing that certain items 
were about to be produced or used or discovered as evidence in a 
burglary inquiry or investigation or proceeding or trial; 
4. did willfully conceal the same with the intent to prevent it from being 
produced or used or discovered. 
3 Interestingly, neither the information or amended information indicated in any fashion 
that it was a felony offense. 
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If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant guilty. If any of the above has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Court's Instruction No. 21. (R. p. 311.) 
Obviously, the jury was not required to find the required elements of criminal 
investigation and felony offense.4 While burglary is mentioned, even assuming 
arguendo that the jury could find this to be an investigation that is criminal in nature, 
there is nothing in the evidence presented to it from which the jury could find that it was 
a felony (regardless of what the bench and bar may know). Further, Peteja, supra, 
held that even where separate instructions advised the jury that investigation of 
controlled substance is a felony and methamphetamine and marijuana are controlled 
substances, the concealment instruction was nevertheless incorrect because it failed to 
itself require the jury to find that the investigation was criminal in nature and involved a 
felony offense. Therefore, the instruction in our case is likewise deficient.5 
So in our case, the facts which enhanced the misdemeanor offense to a felony 
were neither charged nor found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. As explained 
by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): 
Our answer to that question was foreshadowed by our opinion in Jones v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999), 
construing a federal statute. We there noted that "under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of 
the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases 
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 526 U.S. at 
4 Of course, had these facts been included in the instruction it would constitute a 
variance since the jury would be finding a different crime from that charged. 
5 Appellant hereby briefly raises the further error of the jury instruction being deficient 
as per Peteja without regard to the Apprendi issue, but will not belabor it here given all 
the other significant errors regarding this count. 
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243, n. 6. The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this 
case involving a state statute. 
Id. 476. 
Our case contained that same violation of the 14th Amendment (as well as the 
underlying Fifth and Sixth Amendments) as in Apprendi when Mr. Meadows was 
convicted and sentenced for the enhanced felony offense. Therefore, Appellant 
asserts that the felony conviction of concealing evidence must be vacated and the 
conviction reduced to a misdemeanor. 
111. 
The District Court Created A Fatal Variance From The State's Information When It 
Changed the Method In Which the Offense of Obstructing An Officer Was Committed 
To A Method That Was Not Charged 
Whether a variance exists between the charging document and the evidence 
presented at trial or between the information and the jury instructions is a question of 
law over which an appellate court exercises free review. See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 
327, 330 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
"A criminal defendant is entitled to be apprised by the charging instrument not 
only of the name of the offense charged but in general terms of the manner in which it is 
alleged to have been committed." Brazil, 136 Idaho at 331, (citing I.C. §§ 19-1303, -
1409 (charging instrument must contain a statement of the acts constituting the 
offense); I.C. § 19-1411 (charging instrument must be direct and certain as it regards 
the particular circumstances of the offense charged); State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 
246-47 (1937) (holding that an information must not only state the name of the alleged 
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crime but also inform the accused as to how it is claimed the accused committed the 
offense.)). 
A variance between the charging instrument and the evidence presented at trial 
or between the charging instrument and the jury instructions violates a defendant's state 
and federal rights to due process if the variance deprived the defendant fair notice of the 
charge against which he had to defend or left him open to the risk of double jeopardy. 
State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18 (1985); Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330-331; State v. 
Love, 76 Idaho 378, 381(1955).6 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the question of whether a district 
court's failure to limit the jury's consideration of harm to that which was alleged in the 
charging instrument is reversible error. In Brazil, the defendant was charged with two 
counts of aggravated battery. Id. at 328-329. On the first count, the Information alleged 
that the battery had caused great bodily harm, "to-wit: shooting [the victim's] knuckle, 
and/or by means of a deadly weapon .... " Id. at 329. On the second count, the 
Information alleged that the battery had caused great bodily harm, "to-wit: shooting the 
tip of [the victim's] finger, and/or by means of a deadly weapon .... " Id. During the 
subsequent jury trial, testimony was elicited to show that the victim also suffered other 
physical injuries during the altercation. Id. at 330. In instructing the jury, the district 
court included the elements of battery and incorporated a requirement that: 
6 There are two types of variances: variances involving a difference between the 
allegations in the charging instrument and the proof adduced at trial, and variances 
involving a difference between the allegations in the charging instrument and the jury 
instructions. State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2004). The analysis for 
both types of variances is the same. Compare, e.g., Windsor, 110 Idaho at417-18, with 
Love, 76 Idaho at 381. 
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4a. when doing so the defendant caused great bodily harm. 
and/or 
4b. used a deadly weapon or instrument. 
Id. 
On appeal, Mr. Brazil asserted that the district court's failure to limit the jury's 
consideration of harm to the harm alleged in the charging document created an 
impermissible variance between the Information and the jury instructions. Id. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals agreed that the jury instructions "departed from the two counts 
of aggravated battery charged in the Information by allowing the jury to find that Brazil 
caused great bodily harm based upon any of the injuries suffered by the victim." Id. 
The Court concluded that "[b]ased upon the inconsistencies ... we conclude that there 
was a variance between the state's charging instrument and the jury instructions." Id. 
Applying this test in Brazil, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the 
variance had prejudiced the defendant in his defense. Id. at 331. Specifically, the 
"information failed to place Brazil on notice of a need to present evidence or argument 
that the victim's other injuries were of insufficient severity to amount to great bodily 
harm." Id. at 331. Additionally, the Court noted that conviction of a crime different from 
that charged is a denial of due process. Id. at 331 (citation omitted). 
Here, the statute under which Mr. Meadows was charged provides as follows: 
§ 18-705. Resisting and obstructing officers 
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer, in 
the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office or who 
knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer, when no other 
punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($ 1,000), and imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one (1) year. 
I.C. § 18-705 (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Meadows was charged by Information and Amended Information with the 
false report method of committing the crime: 
COUNT HI 
That the Defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, on or about the 1th 
day of November, 2009, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
willfully resist and/or obstruct a public officer(s} to-wit: Officers C. Buhl and 
B. McCormick, Coeur d' Alene Police Department, in the discharge of a 
duty of their office by knowingly [sic] make a false report the officers, all 
of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case 
made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the 
State of Idaho. 
Information, p. 2 (emphasis added( (R. p. 102.) 
However, the jury was not instructed as to the false report method of committing 
the offense, but instead, was instructed as follows: 
In order for the defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, to be 
guilty of Resisting or Obstructing an Officer, as charged in Count 111, 
the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 1th day of November, 2009; 
2. in the State of Idaho; 
3. the defendant, DUPREE LAMAR MEADOWS, willfully; 
4. resisted and/or obstructed and/or delayed a public officer; 
5. in the discharge of or attempt to discharge a duty of his office. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the 
above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find 
the defendant guilty. 
Court's Instruction No. 22.8 
7 Appellant notes that the Information and Amended Information erroneously cite the 
offense as I.C. 18-1705. 
8 For unknown reasons, the page with this instruction is not numbered in the record, but 
it falls between instruction 21 and 23 and pages 311 and 312. 
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Further, the prosecution never argued the false report method of committing the 
crime, and instead argued that while Mr. Meadows probably didn't resist the officer, 
there was evidence that he obstructed or delayed the officers by his response to them 
when they told him he was under arrest. (Supp. Tr. of Closing Arguments, p. 91-92.) 
There is an obvious variance here, both between the allegations in the 
Information and the proof adduced at trial, as well as between the allegations in the 
Information and the jury instructions. Mr. Meadows was never given notice that he had 
to defend against anything other than a false report method of committing the crime. 
This error is reversible here because Mr. Meadows could not be convicted of the false 
report method of committing the crime as a matter of law. 
In State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885 (Ct. App. 1995), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals discussed the resisting and obstructing an officer statute: 
Although this statute prohibits giving "a false report" to a peace officer, as 
well as conduct that resists, delays, or obstructs an officer, the district 
court held that the Brandstetter indictment did not charge a violation under 
the false report provision of I.C. § 18-705. The district court stated: 
Idaho Code § 18-705, by "general language," includes an offense 
of "obstructing an officer." It also includes the explicit crime of 
obstructing an officer by knowingly giving a false report. 
The context and use of the phrase "knowingly gives a false report" 
in I.C. § 18-705 would lead the court to the same conclusion as 
that found by the court in People v. Smith, cited at 131 Cal. App. 2d 
Supp. 889, 281 P.2d 103 (Cal. App. 1955). In Smith the court ruled 
that the word "report" when used in the context of an obstruction 
ordinance seemed to "connote a statement written or oral made 
upon the initiative of one who resorts to the police department or a 
member thereof for the specific purpose of having some action 
taken with respect thereto rather than by way of response to the 
question of an officer." Id. at 281 P.2d 104. 
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The clear language of the indictment charges the defendant with 
obstruction by making a false statement. Based upon this language 
and the rationale of the Smith case it is the conclusion of the court 
that the state has not pied a charge of obstructing an officer by 
false report. Therefore if the indictment charges a criminal violation 
it must be found under the general language of the statute in regard 
to persons who willfully obstruct a public officer. [Footnotes 
omitted.] 
The State does not challenge this holding on appeal, but instead argues 
that Brandstetter's giving the false statement in response to the officers' 
inquiry constitutes "obstructing" an officer. Thus, the question on appeal is 
whether under the particular facts of this case the nonthreatening false 
statement, not made under oath, falls within the purview of the § 18-705 
prohibition against obstructing an officer. 
Id. at p. 887-888 (footnote omitted). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded: 
Here, we believe it is doubtful that Brandstetter can be said to have 
hampered police officials in the exercise of their duties by falsely 
responding to a question which he was not legally obligated to answer. His 
deliberate falsification was no more obstructive than would have been his 
silence. Because Brandstetter could have remained silent when 
questioned by the law enforcement officials, his unsworn oral 
misstatement cannot be said to have increased the officers' burden, on the 
facts presented here. We, therefore, find that Brandstetter's making of an 
unsworn false oral statement to the police was not an obstruction of an 
officer within the meaning of I.C. § 18-705. Because we conclude that this 
type of speech did not violate I.C. § 18-705, we do not reach arguments 
presented by the parties based on the district court's additional reasons for 
its decision. 
Id. at p. 888. 
In other words, Brandstetter held that an "exculpatory no" type statement in 
response to a criminal investigation does not constitute the crime of obstructing or 
resisting officers under the obstructing an officer method of committing the crime. 
Further, while the Idaho Court of Appeals did not need to reach the issue due to the 
state's concession, based on the reasoning of the California case discussed by the 
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district court, a suspect denying a crime does not commit the crime under the false 
report method either. That factual scenario would be more akin to a person going to the 
police and falsely reporting that a crime had been committed than a suspect simply 
denying he had committed a crime. 
So as applied to our case, since Mr. Meadows was simply denying the crime, he 
did not commit the offense of obstructing an officer in the way it was charged, to wit, by 
false report. Therefore, he was prejudiced when the proof at trial and jury instructions 
allowed him to be convicted by resort to a different method of committing the crime. 
Appellant notes that Mr. Meadows' counsel did not object to this below. 
However, Appellant asserts that it is nevertheless reviewable in the first instance on 
appeal since it constitutes fundamental error under State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), 
which requires: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning . . . that 
it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
245 P.3d at 978. The defendant must prove that the error was not harmless by 
demonstrating "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." 
Id. 
The error in the instant case is fundamental under Perry. Mr. Meadows is 
challenging a variance from the charging document which he alleges is fatal, which is a 
violation of his due process right to notice. See State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 47 (Ct. 
App. 2007)(holding that a variance between from the charging document requires 
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reversal when it deprives a defendant of his substantial rights by violating the 
defendant's right to fair notice or leaving him open to the risk of double jeopardy); State 
v. Cariaga, 95 Idaho 900, 903-904 (197 4) ("Because the variance between the 
complaint and conviction denies the appellant due process of law, she has not waived 
her right to object even though no objection has been previously made."). As such, Mr. 
Meadows is challenging a violation of his constitutional rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
Next, the error in this case is clear and obvious. In the instant case, there is 
nothing indicating that defense counsel for Mr. Meadows intentionally waived the 
variance and there is no reasonable tactical decision for failing to object to the jury 
instructions varying from the charging document. Finally, Mr. Meadows' substantial 
rights were affected as Wolfrum, supra, explained: 
A variance between the charging document and a jury instruction requires 
reversal of a conviction only where the defendant was deprived of fair 
notice of the charge against which he must defend or is left opens to the 
risk of double jeopardy. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 
889 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 
1182, 1189-90 (1985). A variance is fatal if it amounts to a "constructive 
amendment." Jones, 140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889. A constructive 
amendment occurs if a variance alters the charging document to the 
extent that the defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or .§. 
different nature. Id.; State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 861 P.2d 1225, 
1231 (Ct. App. 1993); United States v. Dipentino, 242 F.3d 1090, 1094 
(9th Cir. 2001 ). 
Id., p. 47 (emphasis added). 
Variously stated, Mr. Meadows was deprived of his right to fair notice of the 
allegations which he must defend against and/or was tried for a crime of a different 
nature than charged (and he could not be convicted of the charged crime). Thus, the 
variance here rises to the level of a constructive amendment and reversal is required. 
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Since reversal is required, the fundamental error is of course not harmless and his 
conviction for obstructing an officer must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Meadows first requests this Couft reverse the district court's order denying 
the motion to suppress all the evidence arising from and following his illegal arrest. 
Alternatively, Mr. Meadows requests this Court vacate his conviction for felony 
concealing evidence since there was insufficient evidence, or as a further alternative, 
reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. Finally, Mr. Meadows requests this Court vacate 
his conviction for obstructing an officer. 
r 
DATED this...:;..;...........,___ day of November, 2011. 
Greg--5. Silvey 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF ¥RVICE 
I I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .. )-/ lay of November, 2011, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing APP . LANT'S BRIEF, by the method as 
indicated below: · 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
31 
() U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 0f Hand Delivered to the Attorney 
· General's mailbox at the 
/ Supreme .Odurt 
Greg S: Silvey 
